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"Never Mind the Manner of My Speech":
The Dilemma of Socrates' Defense in the Apology"
Thomas D. Eisele
University of Tennessee College of Law

Those who guard themselves from philosophy
show a healthier respect for it than those who
are certain they know its results and know to
whom they apply. For when philosophy is
called for one cannot know beforehand where
it will end.
- Stanley Cavell!

What might we learn from reading Plato's Apology? Socrates, the
foremost teacher in Western culture, is on trial for his life, and he
defends the way he has lived by describing how he has conducted himself; this means describing how he has taught and what he has taught and
why he teaches as he does. The charge against Socrates is that he does
not believe in the traditional deities of Athens and instead has introduced
new deities (an apparent reference to his inner voice, his daimonion).This
impiety on his part has led him to corrupt Athenian youths influenced
by his teaching, making them irreverent toward their elders and the gods
their elders accept and worship. Here we have a great moment in
Western thought and action, and in Western education, and in Western
law: it deserves a great response. Two common ways of responding to
this text draw mutually incompatible morals from it.
On one reading, probably the most popular, Socrates' defense
vindicates his activities in Athens. This trial is a war between good and
evil, with Socrates representing the good side, defending liberalism and
its values of free inquiry and free speech. On this reading, while Socrates
loses the battle for his life, he wins the war for our hearts and minds.
His defense speech is thus thought to be convincing to any reasonable
reader outside the confines of fourth century Athens, and subsequent
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historical events (e.g., the turning of the Athenians against the accusers
of Socrates; the entire course of Western experience with freedom of
expression, dissent, and censorship in liberal democracies and republics)
are seen as clearly vindicating his position vis-a-vis the persecuting
Athenian majority.
In the single best treatment of Plato's text of which I know, Eva
Brann states that this approach to the Apology typically takes the following form: "A first reading of Socrates' defense before the court of the
Athenian people as handed down by Plato induces an exalted feeling in
favor of Socrates .... We hear a philosopher nobly coping with a persecuting populace. "2
The next most common reading seems (in view of several recent
books on the Apology) to be gaining favor. On this view, Socrates is
simply guilty, and all the nobility of his address cannot change that sad
fact. Here I am thinking of recent books by I. F. Stone and Thomas G.
West, both of which chronicle very carefully and conscientiously the
inadequacies in Socrates' defense and the merits in Athens' brief against
him,· and of the most recent book on the Apology, that by Brickhouse
and Smith, which to a lesser, more moderate extent, raises similar doubts
about Socrates' defense. 3 The adherents of this second reading of the text
"vary," again according to Professor Brann, "for the most part, from
respectably conservative through illiberal, even to reactionary .... "4
Both readings assume that we are in a position to adjudicate the
merits of this trial, and that a proper response requires us to make a
judgment, to choose sides. But I think that this shared assumption is
wrong. In my view, the Apology poses a dilemma for us, its readers, just
as Socrates' trial posed a dilemma for his jurors. And the instruction we
receive from this dilemma lies not (at least, not initially) in our judgment
of Socrates' guilt or innocence, or of Athens' folly or wisdom in prosecuting this case, but rather in how we take the words this work offers us.
I 'V.'ant to re-consider this Platonic text by focusing on the specific
question with which it opens - and which it perhaps never leaves namely, How are we to take Socrates, his words and his claims? Our
response to this question re-enacts the plight of Socrates' jurors, I think,
in that here we are asked (as they were challenged) to find a way to
orient ourselves in a truthful, fruitful way toward Socrates. Similarly,
however, we need to see that the trial process also makes a demand upon
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Socrates, asking him as it were to find a truthful, fruitful orientation
toward his jurors.
.

§ 1. How Are We to Understand Socrates?
The initial terms of understanding that we have for this text are
proposed by Socrates in his opening statement.
I do not know what impression my accusers have made
upon you, Athenians. But I do know that they nearly made me
forget who I was, so persuasive were they. And yet they have
scarcely spoken one single word of truth. Of all their many
falsehoods, the one which astonished me most was their saying
that I was a clever speaker, and that you must be careful not to
let me deceive you. I thought that it was most shameless of them
not to be ashamed to talk in that way. For as soon as I open my
mouth they will be refuted, and I shall prove that I am not a
clever speaker in any way at all - unless, indeed, by a clever
speaker they mean someone who speaks the truth. If that is their
meaning, I agree with them that I am an orator not to be compared with them. My accusers, I repeat, have said little or
nothing that is true, but from me you shall hear the whole truth.
Certainly you will not hear a speech, Athenians, dressed up, like
theirs, with fancy words and phrases. I will say to you what I
have to say, without artifice, and I shall use the first words which
come to mind, for I believe that what I have to say is just; so let
none of you expect anything else. Indeed, my friends, it would
hardly be right for me, at my age, to come before you like a
schoolboy with his concocted phrases. But there is one thing,
Athenians, which I do most earnestly beg and entreat of you. Do
not he surprised and do not interrupt with shouts if in my
defense I speak in the same way that I am accustomed to speak
in the market place, at the tables of the money-changers, where
, many of you have heard me, and elsewhere. The truth is this: I
am more than seventy, and this is the first time that I have ever
come before a law court; thus your manner of speech here is
quite strange to me. If I had really been a stranger, you would
have forgiven me for speaking in the language and the manner of
my native country. And so now I ask you to grant me what I
think I have a right to claim. Never mind the manner of my
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speech - it may be superior or it may be inferior to the usual
manner. Give your whole attention to the question, whether
what I say is just or not? That is what is required of a good
judge, as speaking the truth is required of a good orator. 5
The tone of this statement is refreshingly direct and its appeal
immediate. Socrates contrasts himself from his accusers along the
dimension of truth: he will tell the jury the truth, whereas his accusers
have not done so. That is the simple core of his defense and it is built
upon a single contrast. While his accusers have stooped to giving
prepared speeches, mere recitals of rehearsed, artificial texts "dressed up
... with fancy words and phrases," Socrates offers only himself as he
stands, his own words in whatever textual form and shape they may
compose as they appear during his voicing of his freshly and freely
minted thoughts, "the first words that come to mind." And the jury, if
it appreciates this difference between the speeches of the prosecution and
the defense, should recognize the justness of Socrates' defense.
None of this seems extraordinary, perhaps, except for the one
place where Socrates pleads for something from his jurors. 6 We know
that this is important because it is so unusual, so uncharacteristic of
Socrates in this forum. He does not otherwise address the jury as a
supplicant/ and it is notorious in the commentaries on this text that
Socrates' attitude toward his jurors is condescending, even haughty.
(One example, noted by Brann and the Wests, among others, is the fact
that Socrates never accords the full jury the customary honorific title of
"judges," but rather only uses this Athenian badge of honor for saluting
those jurors who voted to acquit him.8) During the course of his
opening statement, however, Socrates "beg[s] and entreat[s]" his jurors
not to interrupt him and not to be surprised by the manner of his
speech; he says that he will talk in the same way in which he is accustomed to speak everyday, in the marketplace or elsewhere. And· he
returns to tllis request at the end of this S;h-ne statement, vlhere he again
asks his jurors to grant him this courtesy, only now he puts it in terms
of a claim of right:
[T]his is the first time that I have ever come before a law court;
thus your manner of speech here is quite strange to me. If I had
really been a stranger, you would have forgiven me for speaking
in the language and the manner of my native country. And so

HeinOnline -- 14 Legal Stud. F. 256 1990

Socrates' Defense in the Apology

257

now I ask you to grant me what I think I have a right to claim.
Never mind the manner of my speech - it may be superior or it
may be inferior to the usual manner.
Socrates' plea is that, being a stranger in the strange land of the law, he
should be accorded the right of a stranger, and be allowed to speak in his
native tongue, the language of everyday life. And from Plato's text, it
is not clear to me whether the jurors grant this request or deny it. But
what difference does it make? Why should Socrates want to insist on
this one point?
One possible answer is that he feels uncomfortable in this situation, constrained by the artificial, or at least foreign, procedures of the
law. His life is at stake, after all, and he does not wish to risk it by
now, after seventy years, suddenly having to speak in legally correct or
cognizable forms (which he may get wrong and thereby be severely and he suggests, unfairly - penalized for breaching). Here one might
note the fact that in Athenian legal proceedings each litigant had to make
a speech on his own, without the direct help of a paid attorney, and this
speech was subject to a time limit. 9 So the pressure on someone in
Socrates' position was immense, and he might understandably balk at the
expectations Athenian law placed upon him. Indeed, both in the context
in which Socrates was speaking and in our context today, where we are
sensitive to the many technicalities and artifices by which the law takes
its course, this kind of claim makes sense.
But Socrates' plea makes a less strong claim on our sympathy in
this respect if we compare it to Socrates' actual performance at trial,
where he shows himself fairly adept at Athenian legal procedure. He is
fully capable of making a speech to the jurors, and a fine speech it is.
Also, despite his disclaimer of legal expertise, Socrates cross-examines
Meletus with dispatch, he uses the correct form of address to the acquitting jurors when he wishes to do so (as noted above), and he understands
and refers to a number of other aspects of Athenian legal procedure (e.g.,
his accuser Meletus' right during his own speech tq offer someone as a
witness against Socrates, of which Meletus does not avail himself [34a];
the right of the accused to invoke his family, to plead for mercy from
the jurors, which Socrates declines to do [34d]). In view of this familiarity, and apparent facility, with Athenian law, it is difficult to regard
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Socrates' plea as a request to exempt himself from these technicalities and
formalities.
Then why does he make the request and press it so strenuously
in his opening statement? I think. that he does so, first, as a way of
drawing to the jurors' attention the fact that he does not fear saying
whatever comes to mind, since his thoughts are true and just, and he can
live with them, come what may. This aspect of Socrates' speech proposes to the jurors a quite specific and peculiar criterion of truth, namely,
the spontaneity of one's words. This, he is saying, is the appropriate test
for the jurors to apply at his trial. Its appeal (which is considerable, I
think) stems from the common perception that, whether or not what
one says is in fact true, at least we believe one's utterance to be more
truthful - honest, more candid - the more spontaneous it is.
On this basis, the spontaneity and naturalness of Socrates'
remarks are contrasted several times with the accusations of his accusers,
and not surprisingly the contrast portrays the accusers unfavorably.
Their remarks are not spontaneous but calculated, or at least are not
motivated by a sincere wish to speak the truth. When Socrates is
speaking about the oldest allegations against him spread by slanderers, for
example, he suggests that these things are said out of hatred, anger, and
envy toward him, because he has seen fit to refute powerful members of
the Athenian polis. [See, e.g., 2lcd, 21e, 23a, 23e, 24ab, 28a.] Then as to
the more recent accusations by Meletus and others, Socrates says that
they do not truly care what they say, but instead simply say anything
that sounds plausible or that may convince the jury in this context, given
the earlier lies spread about him. Meletus, for example, is scolded by
Socrates for not taking his accusations against Socrates seriously; he
rather must be joking or speaking ironically in them. [See, e.g., 24c, 24d,
2Sc, 26b, 26e-27a, 27e.] This is frivolous behavior about a grave and
sacred matter, and it indicts Meletus of impiety more than it does
Socrates, A nd sometimes Socrates says that his recent accusers are
calculating in that they rely upon the known irritation that Socrates'
questioning causes others to promote their own false accusations against
him. They are planning on the credulity of the jurors, affected by earlier
slanders and rumors spread against Socrates, to make their later,
otherwise unconvincing accusations more credible. [See, e.g., 19b.] All
of these factors suggest that Socrates is speaking truthfully in his defense,
while his accusers are not.
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Then too, Socrates' emphasis on his presentation being an unprepared or unrehearsed speech is a way that he has for trying to orient his
jurors with respect to the charges against him. He wants his jurors to
take the charges in a non-legalistic manner. These charges deal with his
entire life and his entire person as it were, and he claims the right to deal
with them accordingly, as a complete person, and not simply as a skilled
legal expert (what we call a "lawyer"). Socrates' defense speech depends
upon its being (and being heard or read as) non-legalistic in a deep sense,
as though he were saying, "Law is too important to be left to the politicians - or the lawyers." (He is saying that.) He wants his jurors to
regard the charges against him in some broader, more generous way,
because he believes that, properly understood, his description of his life
and way of teaching will be seen to be not impious and not corrupting
of Athenian youth (and, in this sense, not contrary to the laws of
Athens). And "properly understood" here means something like: Not
as a lawyer might understand his life, but as an ordinary citizen and
speaker might understand his life.
This reading raises the basic dilemma posed by this text: How are
we to understand Socrates, his words and his actions? Are we to understand him legalistically? If so, what does that make of him? Of us? Of
our (possible or actual) community? And, if we don't understand Socrates legalistically, then how are we to understand him (and what does
this other way of understanding make of him, us, and our community)?
He suggests that we are to understand him in an ordinary or everyday
sense, but this suggestion only replaces one question with another: What
is an "ordinary" or "everyday" understanding of his words and activities?

§2. How'Does Socrates Address His Jurors?
The first bothersome aspect of Socrates' defense is that he asks his
jurors to abjure the very law they are supposed to apply. He claims to
speak outside of the law, without its help (i.e., without whatever aid and
assistance the law might afford him in terms of its potpourri of linguistic,
procedural, and evidentiary instruments). And yet he seems freely to
avail himself of legal aids (e.g., cross-examining witnesses, giving speeches,
requesting evidence) when it suits him, and even claims that on a certain
broad view of the charges against him, he is innocent. This seems
inconsistent, and perhaps duplicitous.
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There is a second, related inconsistency with Socrates' plea to the
jury. While he seems to be asking them to treat him and his case in a
non-legalistic manner, at the end of his long speech relating to the issue
of his guilt or innocence, he suggests that the jurors must judge him by
the law, dispassionately, regardless of whether or not they like him or
admire his activities [see 35b-d]. It seems, then, that he wants his jurors
to conceive of the charges against him broadly - and narrowly. Sometimes he disclaims any intent to measure himself against the categories
of the law, and yet at other times he seems to concede the fact that
whatever defense he makes must be made within the law, must be legally
cognizable, because the forum in which he now speaks and acts is after
all a court of law.
Well, I must make my defense, Athenians, and try in the
short time allowed me to remove the prejudice which you have
been so long a time acquiring. I hope that I may manage to do
this, if it be best for you and for me, and that my defense may be
successful; but I am quite aware of the nature of my task, and I
know that it is a difficult one. Be the outcome, however, as is
pleasing to god, I must obey the law and make my defense. 10
When one looks at what Socrates actually does in his defense
speech (and here I am speaking, for the moment, only about that portion
dealing with his guilt or innocence [17a-35d], not his punishment or his
concluding remarks [35e-42a]), it breaks down into five related segments,
during some of which he pedorins like a lawyer, in others of which he
eschews that role. His opening speech [17a-18a], quoted above (see text
at note 5), attempts to deflect or deflate the accusations of his accusers
and to propose the truth of his own claims. This is a typical lawyer-like
statement, and a very good job of lawyering indeed. 11 Then his defense
moves to its second segment, in which Socrates responds to the oldest
allegations against him [i8a-24bj. Even though these allegations are not
a part of the actual indictment in these proceedings, Socrates argues that
they have prepared the ground in the jurors' minds for the more recent
accusations against him, so first he must extirpate these old charges from
the minds of his jurors if he is to defend himself successfully. After
disposing of these old allegations (while expressing his regrets that he
cannot call these rumor-mongers and slanderers directly before this
court for cross-examination and refutation [see 18d]), he turns his
HeinOnline -- 14 Legal Stud. F. 260 1990
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attention and attack to the charges currently pending against him [24b28a]. This third segment of the text comprises its only stretch of
dialogue of any kind, and it is pretty feeble. Socrates' cross-examination
of Meletus consists mostly of Socrates badgering and gainsaying the
hostile witness, who himself fairly quickly refuses to participate in the
process.
By this point in his defense, we have had three legalistic speeches
by Socrates, contrary to what he has told his audience he would offer
them, and one begins to wonder about the sincerity of his opening
remarks. But then, in the fourth segment, he moves to a broader
question, which has to do with why he does what he does, and this
becomes his broader justification of his activities, his philosophizing [28b30d]. Here he speaks most intimately and personally about why he feels
impelled to philosophize, to converse with his neighbors and fellowcitizens and to refute them in their claims of knowledge, and this speech
amounts to Socrates' self-justification. If you ask him why he does what
he does, this is his answer. And then, in the fifth and final segment of
this portion of his defense speech, Socrates turns the question around, as
it were, and speaks selflessly, arguing in the alternative that, whether or
not his own self-justification makes sense or persuades his jurors, they
should acquit him on the basis of their own self-interest [30d-3Sd]. Here
he argues that what he does is good for the city, good for Athens, and
good for those who listen to him and engage with him in dialectical
conversation. This activity does no one harm, but rather does all of
them good, and the jurors ought to see that this is a gift, not a threat, to
them. Accordingly, as Socrates says in closing this segment of his
defense [34e-3Sd], he has no need and no wish to flatter the court or to
curry their favor or to plead with them on the basis of pity or sympathy. Properly understood, what he does is a vast benefit to them, and
they ought not throw it - or him - away.
My problem with this sophisticated and complicated defense is
that it strikes me as though Socrates wants to have it both ways at once.
He wants to avail himself of the power and protection and procedure of
the law when they benefit him, and the first three segments in his
defense speech are masterpieces of lawyer-like arguments about the
meaning and reach of the indictment against him. On the other hand,
he also wants to have the right to speak outside the law, to eschew the
law when it benefits him, and the last two segments in this portion of
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his defense speech are fine attempts at raising some extra-legal concerns
and considerations in his favor. It is not exactly that 1 begrudge him this
duality, which strikes me as wonderfully resourceful, so much as it is
that he seems to me to be enacting a kind of duplicity toward the jury.
Socrates has suggested (if my reading above is correct) that he is not
playing both roles here, is not speaking effectively in both modes, the
legal and the ordinary or everyday, but rather that he is simply speaking
as an ordinary citizen might about such matters. 1 don't say that this
duplicity falsifies what he says, but rather it refutes him, his claim to
have a certain status or role in these proceedings, namely, the status or
role of an uncalculating plain-speaker. And he seems to think that no
one - especially not the jury - will notice the fact that, despite his protestations to the contrary, he is speaking out of both sides of his mouth.
This kind of duplicity is, then, the ...vay he treats the jury. He acts
as though the jurors are not capable of seeing or understanding this
doubleness in his speech, just as he claims that they are not capable of
making up their own minds (he argues that their minds have been prejudiced by earlier rumors and slanders). The impression 1 get is that
Socrates thinks that the jurors cannot think for themselves. So he must
help them think.
This much is true: Socrates must - should - help his jurors
think. But the question is, Haw? How can one person help another
person think for himself, or a body of people think for themselves?
Surely not by doing their thinking for them. Rather, one needs to do
exactly what Socrates here and elsewhere claims to do in his philosophizing - to provoke them to take thought of and on their own.
Dialectic is the method Socrates invented to get people to think for
themselves, and it accounts for his entire life, his way of living. "I am
constantly alighting upon you at every point to arouse, persuade, and
reproach each of you all day long. "12 These are proud words, almost said
boastfully (cert~;n ly said reproachfully), but how well does Socrates'
performance in the Apology match his words and claim?
Socrates begins his opening statement by expressing concern for
the "impression "13 that his accusers have made upon his jurors. There
is nothing wrong with this concern; in fact, it is natural that a good
lawyer would be concerned with the impression that opposing counsel
and witnesses have made on the court or jury. And one of the best ways
to begin to overcome this initial impression is to call attention to it,
HeinOnline -- 14 Legal Stud. F. 262 1990
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making the jury conscious of the fact that up to this point in the trial
process, they have been getting only one version of the facts, the
. ,
prosecution s.
As I say, this concern is understandable in Socrates' opening
statement. But why, I want to know, does he express this concern in
terms of the "impression" that the prosecution has made on the jury?
By doing so, Socrates accepts (or suggests to the jury that he accepts) this
as a viable term for characterizing how one is to address the jury. And,
for two reasons, it is not acceptable.
First, emphasizing the impressionability of the jury suggests that
it is a malleable body, something like a piece of wax, on which a
competent attorney puts his or her impress, fixing it with the impression
that the attorney desires by stamping it. This is what rhetoric is supposed to do to its auditors, as famously noted and criticized by Socrates
in other Platonic dialogues, and it is not something to which he normally would be a party. Second, this term of address suggests that the jury
may have been "impressed" by his accusers, whereas Socrates wants to
make them and their accusations much less impressive. But this puts
Socrates in the position of accepting or endorsing the view of jurors as
passive entities (upon which a successful attorney, like any good rhetorician, can put his impress), and as impressionable entities (easily or readily
impressed by competent orators).
These two characterizations of jurors are not inevitable or inescapable aspects of such deliberative bodies. Socrates could have noted them
as pitfalls into which some juries fall but against which, forewarned, this
jury, his jury, is forearmed. This would have cast Socrates in the role of
one who vies against such demeaning characterizations of the jury, one
who tries to help the jury be the best it can be, not the worst (or the
average) it can be. In addition, to speak from the outset in terms of
"impressions" seems to me not only to concede the rightness or
inevitability of a passive, impressionable role for the jury, but also to
orient Socrates himself toward the jury in terms of impressionability. In
a sense, then, in addressing the jurors so, he is making himself into a
rhetorician or sophist, making him no better than his accusers. This
assumed role seems especially foolish to me, in that it has the effect of
a self-fulfilling prophecy, first by ascribing to the jury the character of
a passive and impressionable entity, and then by reinforcing this ascribed
character through Socrates' own mode of address. I think that this
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would make the jury only more susceptible to manipulation by his
accusers, thus playing right into their hands.
The apparent endorsement and enactment of this conception of
the jury in Socrates' manner of addressing his jurors have real implications for his defense; they seem to me to contravene everything Socrates
stands for. His example in other Platonic dialogues insists upon nothing
less than a strenuous, never-ending attempt to foster the best in all of us
- he seeks to evoke, or provoke, the best response, the best performance,
the best expression, from every human being he meets in the daily
intercourse of his life. In the Eutbyphro, for example, after telling
Euthyphro, "[M]y love of men makes me talk to everyone whom I meet
quite freely and unreservedly," Socrates goes on to berate Euthyphro for
his lackadaisical response to this great opportunity to explore with him
and to teach him about the meaning of piety: "I will do my best to help
you to explain to me what piety is, for I think that you are lazy. Don't
give in yet... . But, as I say, the wealth of your wisdom makes you
complacent. Exert yourself, my good friend: I am not asking you a
difficult question."14 And at his trial, this is exactly how he justifies
himself, by claiming that this goal is what he has constantly kept before
his eyes while he has been refuting and reproaching his fellow-citizens.
"I went to each of you privately to perform the greatest benefaction ...
and I attempted to persuade each of you not to care for any of his own
things until he cares for himself, how he will be the best and most
prud ent POSSI·ble, .... "15
Yet Socrates seems to ignore this aspect of his teaching in the way
in which he actually relates and speaks to his jurors. So his defense puts
him in a false or hypocritical position, one that falsifies his teaching and
the values he has exemplified up to this point in his life.
The best function of a court and jury is not to be a passive or
impressionable entity. Instead, as Socrates rightly says in his opening
rl18a; see :uso 35c1.J, the function of a Ji\ld~e is to iud'le (actively) the
:meech
.c
justness and truth of what the parties before the court say. Yet this best
function of the court cannot be served except with the help of counsel;
counsel must help to activate the judge and jury, counsel must engage
them, bringing them into the trial process so that they know and
understand and appreciate what is going on and what is at stake. In
these and other ways, an active attorney is the necessary reciprocal
element in achieving the goal of an active, engaged judge and jury. (This
0
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reciprocity between the activity of court and counsel is a basic commitment in the Anglo-American common law, expressed in its ideal that
each litigant should have access to an active, competent attorney.) The
court's doing its job depends upon counsel doing his or her job, and here
Socrates fails to do what he says he will do - speak truthfully to the jury
- thereby encouraging or acquiescing in a passive model of juries. Thus,
he does violence to this trial and to his own ideals.
§3. Does Socrates Engage in Dialectic? With Whom?
If Socrates were truly to defend his life in this legal proceeding,
then I should think that he would do so in part by performing the
values of that very life, or rather, its virtues, which include his willingness, his eagerness, to engage others dialectically. What better way to
illustrate this virtue than by engaging the jurors themselves? But he does
not do this. Instead, he lectures his jurors, giving them speeches and
asking them not to interrupt him. Viewing juries as passive, and composed of impressionable people apparently easily manipulated, Socrates
misses the chance to engage these people in dialectic. It is as though he
did not see the relevance of his own dialectical method to this occasion,
this process. Thus, Socrates foregoes the best chance he has of justifying
his actions in the eyes of the jury, because he denies them a first-hand
experience of the value and result of his practice. He neglects the chance
to do what he does best, engage in dialectic, the experience of which
might give the lie to the ascriptions of harm that his accusers make
against his teaching.
But to assert, as I have, that Socrates "foregoes" an opportunity
to engage his jurors dialectically implies that a real chance for dialectic
exists in this situation, and does it? One response would be, No. In this
context, it is impossible for Socrates to engage his jurors dialectically.
Dialectic (as I understand it) works by changing the parties who
participate within it. For it to have this effect, however, one must
submit to it. You cannot gain the power or advantage of dialectic
without submitting yourself to its costs, its terrors; this is its price.
Dialectic proceeds by self-discovery, not forced compulsion by way of
argument or logic. (This is not to say that self-clarification cannot be
aided by argument or logic; only, that for these problems our eventual
recognition or acknowledgment of the truth cannot be forced on us or
compelled by way of argument or logic.)
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Socrates espouses this view of dialectic in the Gorgias, for example, when he offers Gorgias the chance to say whether or not he
chooses to go ahead with the discussion just begun:
I imagine, Gorgias, that you, too, have taken part in many
discussions and have discovered in the course of them this
peculiar situation arising: people do not find it easy by an
exchange of views to arrive at a mutually satisfactory definition
for the subjects under discussion, and in this way bring the
argument to an agreeable end. Rather, when they disagree on
any point, and one declares the other to be guilty of incorrect or
vague statements, they grow angry and imagine that everything
that is said proceeds from ill will, not from any concern about
the matters under discussion. Some of these arguments end most
disgracefully, breaking up in mutual vituperation to such an
extent that the bystanders are annoyed at themselves for having
become auditors of such people. Now why do I say this?
Because at the moment you seem to me to be making statements
which do not follow from, and are not consistent with, what you
first said about rhetoric. I hesitate, therefore, to embark on a
refutation in the fear that you may imagine that I am speaking,
not with a view to illuminating our subject, but to discredit you.
Now if you are the sort of person I am, I shall gladly continue
the questions and answers; if not, I shall let them go. And what
sort of person am I? One of those who are happy to be refuted
if they make a false statement, happy also to refute anyone else
who may do the same, yet not less happy to be refuted than to
refute .... If, then, you declare yourself to be such a person as
I am, let us continue the discussion; but if you think we ought to
let it go, let us at once dismiss it and close the interview. 16
It seems to me reasonably clear that none of the accust:I'S of

Socrates is willing to be refuted in this sense, or is submitting himself to
scrutiny in open court for the sake of engaging in dialectic with Socrates.
In fact, Socrates does all that he can in this regard. As to the oldest
allegations against him (as I said above), he avows his desire to engage
and cross-examine those responsible for these slanders against him [18d];
but they are not available to him. And, as to his recent accusers, his
dialectical engagement with Meletus is fleeting and abortive because
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Meletus refuses anything more than a perfunctory participation. And the
allotted time for Socrates' defense speech is passing. 17
The point is, then, that dialectic as a process of arriving at the
truth requires, or has as one of its conditions, that each participant
submit himself or herself voluntarily to the process. Participants in
dialectic must want to engage, must be willing to submit themselves
(their words and opinions) to dialectical scrutiny and testing - and they
must be ready, willing, and able to face and accept the consequences, the
possible refutation (humiliation) of themselves that is at the heart of
dialectic. This is both the promise and the threat of dialectic.
Similarly, it is difficult to imagine the jurors as capable of being
engaged dialectically. For all we know, Athenian legal procedure may
prohibit it. And besides, what good would it do Socrates? It avails him
nothing to respond to hecklers; it may even be that he serves only to
dignify such interruptions if he responds to them. One might go further
still and say that, indeed, Socrates does engage his jurors dialectically. To
say this would mean that one has asked and answered the following
question: What would dialectic look like here, in this context (an
Athenian court)? The claim would be that Socrates does engage his
jurors in dialectic, in the sense that he refuses to flatter them [see e.g.
34e-35d]. His refusal to pander to them is dialectical in the sense that it
amounts to insisting that, if the jurors are to acquit him, they must do
so on his (philosophical) terms, not theirs (i.e., their political or social or
personal terms). This is courageous, and dialectical. IS
My problem with this claim is that it seems to conceive of
dialectic as having essentially the characteristic of refusing to fl:mer its
audience. This may be one characteristic of dialectic but is it the only
essential one? I think not. Also essential to dialectic is the fact that its
participants befriend one another. 19 In particular, I believe, it is crucial
that Socrates (the inventor of dialectic) show the others with whom he
is engaging in this exercise a kind of presumptive friendship. (Sometimes, of course, it is Socrates who asks to be befriended by his interlocutor, as when he solicits Euthyphro to help him learn about piety, or
when he berates Meletus for failing to correct his (Socrates ') wrongdoings
when he (Meletus) first became aware of them. 20 The failure, either way,
is one of educative friendship.)
Friendship of a certain kind is what Socrates offers his p~ici
pants in the various Platonic dialogues, where an important part of the
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drama is the companionability of two people trying to learn from one
another something about a third thing. Whatever discoveries Socrates
makes by means of dialectical engagement with others are made in the
company of those others and with their help and assistance. The editors
of the Apology refer to this as the "social character" of Socrates' "philosophical conversations. "21 These editors also cite in this regard Socrates'
use of a maxim borrowed from Homer: "' When two go together, one
sees before the other,' for all men are then more resourceful in action,
statement, and thought." 22 This social aspect of dialectic seems to have
at least two facets.
One facet is that the kinds of topics under Socratic study are
important to us all. These are matters that are not to be -and cannot be
- determined or adjudicated by one person alone, no matter who he or
she is, no matter how brilliant or powerful he or she may be. "[F]or it
is perfectly true that the matters we are disputing are by no means
trivial; rather, they are practically the very ones which to know is
noblest and not to know is most disgraceful .... "23 Questions of knowledge and virtue and justice and courage and prudence and piety and
rhetoric (and the like) are problems for human beings - they are ours and we cannot cede our responsibility for answering them to others; nor
can anyone of us arrogate to himself or herself the right to answer these
matters on his or her own for the rest of us.
The other facet is that we find answers or formulate responses to
these keenly social matters by way of personal revelations, personal
examinations and discoveries. A satisfying answer to common problems
can be produced through the dialectical process only in so far as each
participant is willing and able to examine and reveal something about
himself or herself. This is so because something important is gained
when a person is willing and able to admit something, or confess
something, or acknowledge something, about himself or herself in front

of others.
Yet Socrates' defense consists almost entirely of monologues and
lectures, neither discussions nor conversations with the sole witness
(Meletus) or with the jury. And there is nothing friendly about Socrates'
manner, nothing sociable about his proud inquiry into the charges
against him, nothing invitingly conversational about his boastful defense.
Instead, it proceeds by assertion and stipulation, not by questioning or
examining propositions {teasing out their possible meaning or implica-
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tions). In his cross-examination of Meletus, for example, Socrates badgers
and hectors him, not drawing him out into possible inconsistencies and
contradictions, but rather merely gainsaying whatever Meletus claims.
[See, e.g., 24d, 2Sb, 25cd, 25e, 26b, 26e.]
Socrates equally tries to bully his jurors, telling them what to
think rather than assisting them (dialectically) to discover for themselves
what they think. Consequently, his unfriendliness comes across loud
and clear to his auditors, those forced to judge the truth or falsity of the
allegations against him. What are they to think? Most likely, that he is
defensive, that he has something to hide. The problem is that Socrates
never gives the jurors a chance to discover the truth for themselves,
because he never engages them dialectically.
Then how might he do so? My suggestion is that Socrates could
have performed dialectic in front of the jury by examining his own
words and actions, his own attempts at self-justification and defense,
thereby allowing the jurors to witness the process of self-refutation firsthand. Then they might know what it meant (to him, to them) and what
it made (of him, of them). But, then, this would have exposed him to
the possibility of self-refutation, the possibility that he might have been
wrong in his life's work, or at least to an admission on his part that
perhaps his fellow Athenians had some just cause for being displeased
with him. It would humiliate him.
Socrates never exposes himself, never makes his own self-justifications and assertions vulnerable to the rigors of dialectic. Instead, when
the jurors try to interject their own voices - perhaps to quarrel with
him, or perhaps to request a clarification - Socrates shuts them out. He
knows what is best for them - or so he seems to think. His words and
actions make his attitude clear:
Do not interrupt me, Athenians, with your shouts.
Remember the request which I made of you, and do not interrupt
my words. I think that it will profit you to hear them. I am
going to say something more to you, at which you may protest,
but do not do that. 24
This rejection of their attempt to interrupt and become involved in the
trial process paints the jurors as people who cannot possibly have
anything worthwhile to say to Socrates, anything worth his pausing and
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listening to. And it paints Socrates as someone who is in a position to
tell these jurors what is best for them (what "will profit" them). This is
not the Socrates we have come to expect - or respect - in th~ Platonic
canon. This Socrates fails to engage his interlocutors dialectically, in the
sense that he fails or refuses to submit himself and his views to the trial
of dialectical examination.

§4. Does Socrates Try to Reveal or Refute Himself?
Other commentators have noted the haughtiness, the arrogance,
that Socrates displays in making his defense, and have read this to mean
that he does not care what his jurors think of him or what they decide
to do with him. Some have even suggested that Socrates means quite
consciously to provoke his jurors, convinced as he is that the verdict
against him is a foregone conclusion. Others have thought that Plato
casts Socrates' defense in this way to show contempt for the weakness
and irrationality of the common democratic rabble when confronted by
a true philosophical intelligence. I think differently. It seems to me that
Socrates is acting naturally, afraid of the trial and its outcome; his
arrogance is a natural expression of his fear, his denial of what is happening to him. But dialectic is supposed to be a means of overcoming such
self-denial.
A part of what makes Socrates' use of dialectic effective in the
other dialogues is the extent to which he proceeds by way of questioning
and examining himself (as well as others). The figure he enacts is that
of someone who is not at all· sure that he knows the answer to his own
questions, and who in fact frequently protests his own ignorance. These
protestations of ignorance often seem forced and feeble, insincere,
especially when matched against his virtuosity in performance, the
knowingness of his argumentation and refutation of others. But I am
convinced that these professions of ignorance serve an important purpose
in the Platonic dialogues, namely, they prepare the way for change, for
learning, by openly and freely acknowledging in public that one might
be wrong, or that one does not know everything but rather has something more to learn. (The act of acknowledging the need for advice
prepares the person to receive the advice one needs.) In this respect,
these professions of ignorance seem to me to serve a role similar to the
one played by the "presumptive friendship" that Socrates expresses for
his interlocutors in dialectic (about which I spoke above): both serve as
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a condition or preparation for gaining knowledge, either of one's self or
of another self, in any event of a human being. And both of these
dialectical conditions seem to me to be akin to what in the law we call
"legal fictions," often valuable contrary-to-fact presumptions which we
use because they enable us to do something in the law that we think it
important to achieve but cannot manage to accomplish without the use
of the fictions.
The humility and openness to correction displayed by Socrates in
the other dialogues are exactly that which might give the lie to the
allegations against him - that he acts impiously and corrupts others.
And the best way to get this defense across to his jurors, I believe, would
be for Socrates to enact the moral of his philosophical method before
these jurors' very eyes. We want the jurors to discover the truth about
Socrates for themselves. In part this is a matter of getting them to
recognize certain things about Socrates which they may have misinterpreted, such as Socrates' philosophical zeal, which he unsuccessfully tries
to get the jurors to see not as impiety but rather as pious obedience to
what he takes to be a divine command from the Delphic oracle.
The story of his relation to the oracle of Delphi turns out to be
a major justification for how he has lived his life. He says that a friend
from his youth, Chaerephon, went to the oracle and "asked if there was
anyone who was wiser than I [Socrates]," and the "priestess answered
that there was no one. "25 Now, this is no more, and no less, than a
simple factual statement, made in the indicative. No one is wiser than
Socrates. It does not say that he is wise; only, that no one is more wise
than he.
Socrates tells us, however, that he took this to be a riddle posed
by the oracle, because he was so aware of his own ignorance. [See 21 b.]
And so he undertook to explore its meaning, which he did by way of
trying to discover someone in Athens wiser than he, whereby he would
have disproved the oracle. But after canvassing the politicians, poets, and
artisans of the city, he discovered that none of them was wiser than
Socrates, in particular, because none was as aware of his or her own
ignorance as Socrates was aware of his own. [See 21b-22e.] And it is
from this examination of himself and others, he tells his jurors, that
there "has arisen such fierce and bitter indignation, and as a result a great
many prejudices about [him]. "26
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What bothers me here is that Socrates takes this narrative uncritically; he seems to think that it obviously warrants and justifies his
behavior toward his fellow Athenians - as though the oracle implored
him to examine them and to descry their ignorance personally and
publicly. But the oracle did no such thing. Rather, Socrates took it
upon himself to read a factual statement in the indicative as a riddle
setting for him an imperative, a task. And this was his choice, not
something forced upon him by the oracle or by his fellow-citizens; he
chose to act this way, toward those words, toward these people.
I find little merit,· then, in his speaking afterwards as though he
had no choice in the matter or as though, in cross-examining his neighbors and friends, he were merely acting under the superior injunction of
a god. Yet this is how he justifies his actions:
It would be very strange conduct on my part if I were to desert

my station now from fear of death or of any other thing when
the god has commanded me - as I am persuaded that he has done
- to spend my life in searching for wisdom, and in examining
myself and others. That would indeed be a very strange thing.
Then certainly I might with justice be brought to trial for not
believing in the gods, for I should be disobeying the oracle, ....
But I do know very well that it is evil and disgraceful to do an
unjust act, and to disobey my superior, whether man or god ...
. 'I will be persuaded by the god rather than you .. , .' This, you
must recognize, the god has commanded me to do. And I think
that no greater good has ever befallen you in the state than my
service to the god. v
To read or take the oracle's words in this way accomplishes two
things at once: Socrates defends himself by refuting the major charge
against him, and he impugns the piety of his accusers and his jurors. To
show that he respects and indeed follows the injunction of the god
demonstrates piety, not impiety, and so he is demonstrating his innocence in respect to the major charge against him. This is what his
refutation of Meletus amounts to -an argument that he, Socrates, cares
more about obeying the gods than does Meletus - and here he is generalizing the claim, showing himself to be more pious than any other
Athenian, because he cares more than any of them for the virtuous
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things, the important things, in life. [See, e.g., 29ab.] Simultaneously,
Socrates impugns his accusers (and his jurors, if they side with his
accusers), because if they indict him for obeying the command of the
god, then they are impious, not he. The best defense, in this case, seems
to be a good offense, and Socrates tries mightily to put his accusers and
jurors on the defensive. 28
This last point is best reflected, I think, in Socrates' proud boast
to be a painful but necessary stimulus to the city: this is his vaunted
"gadfly" role.
For if you put me to death, you will not easily find another who,
if I may use a ludicrous comparison, clings to the state as a sort
of gadfly to a horse that is large and well-bred but rather sluggish
because of its size, so that it needs to be aroused. It seems to me
that the god has attached me like that to the state, ... .29
This is a ludicrous comparison. A gadfly is a pest, a nuisance, that serves
no earthly purpose other than to torment creatures whom it bites and
stings. It may be true that occasionally a creature needs to be aroused,
needs to be awakened from its dogmatic slumbers, but not always and
not everywhere.
Just so, one might respond: Philosophy is not incessant; it is
called for only on specific occasions for specific reasons, and the Platonic
dialogues show us such occasions. I agree, only not with the idea that
this relationship is successfully pictured by means of the image of a
gadfly. My own preference is very much for the "midwife" image of
Socrates that we receive in the Ibeaetetus. 30 In addition, it is important
to remember that one can be awakened in any number of ways, some
more productive than others. (When Thoreau wanted to picture himself
as an awakener of another slumbering culture, he chose the image of a
chanticleer, something quite other than a gadfly. 31) So the gadfly image,
chosen by Socrates, is controversial, worth conversing about.
I am not arguing that Socrates' claim (to have been obeying the
command of a god in undertaking his philosophical activity of examining
and refuting his interlocutors) is false; I don't know that it is, and no one
else can know either. But of all the people in the world placed to
question or inquire into this matter, Socrates is best placed to do so.
And that is my point, namely, that Socrates fails to test his own asser-
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tions in this regard. He fails to refute (rather, to try to refute) himself,
to see whether any inconsistency exists among his words, his actions.
None there may be, but we - and he - shall never know, if he fails to
test his own words here and now. If an unexamined life is not worth
living, as Socrates says [see 38a], then surely an unexamined claim is not
worth believing.
In Socrates' work, self-refutation (elenchus) is the goal of his
dialectical method. He invents a process of getting a person to convict
himself, refute himself, with his own words. At some point in most
Platonic dialogues, there comes an uncomfortable moment, a bitter
moment even, when Socrates' interlocutor is led to admit, or is asked to
concede, that what he has said before is inconsistent with what he has
just then been saying, or said he believed or knew to be the case.
Socrates is a master at getting someone to this crux, this position of pain
and embarrassment. Yet here at his trial, rather than Socrates leading
some other person through the process of dialectic toward the goal of
self-refutation, it is Socrates who must suffer this fate. Poetic justice,
perhaps, but also rough justice. But Socrates declines his own medicine.
I do not see that he anywhere entertains the possibility that he
might be wrong about how he has taken the Delphic oracle's statement,
that perhaps his activities amongst the Athenians are not justified by a
god's command. And yet it seems clear to me that the oracle's statement
is not necessarily a command, but rather that Socrates has chosen to
interpret it so, to take those words in that fashion. He is answerable for
such a choice. But he does not seem to see - certainly, he never acknowledges in his defense speeches - that perhaps he might be wrong
here, or that his way of taking the oracle's statement might need examination and correction. This is a kind of self-blindness, and a kind of
irresponsibility.

§5. Does Socrates Take Responsibility for Himself?
Socrates' method begins and ends with the self, yet along the way
it paradoxically includes others. But to accomplish this, one must speak
candidly about oneself in front of others. As James Boyd White characterizes Socrates' example in the Gorgias, "[A] dialectical refutation
(elenchus) requires that one make the other agree with what one says ...
. What matters between us is not the other witnesses who can be
brought forward to support your view or mine but whether you can
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make me your witness or I can make you mine. For dialectic to exert
its full force upon the individual mind, complete frankness is essential,
a kind of shamelessness in saying what one really thinks. "32 In this
respect, I am not sure that Socrates meets his own test; several of his
statements make me wonder whether he is being truthful here, whether
he is truly engaging with his jurors during his defense. This lack of
candor makes him much less credible than he otherwise would be, and
it continues his refusal to treat his audience as equals, as partners in
dialectic ("friends It) worthy of respect and fair-<iealing.
One instance comes in Socrates' response to his accusers calling
him a "clever speaker," an appellation he denies. (See text at note S.) In
fact, he claims that this accusation is the worst of "their many falsehoods." (One problem for Socrates is that, if this is the worst of their
falsehoods and it proves true, then what are we to infer about the truth
of the rest of their allegations?) It seems to me to be rather obvious that
Socrates is a clever speaker, whether you read "clever" here to mean
"resourceful" speaker, or instead, "tricky" speaker.
In most of Plato's dialogues, Socrates demonstrates again and
again his resourcefulness. Anyone who reads a Platonic dialogue will see
this kind of cleverness in his speech - it is one of his powers, in which
he revels. (This can both attract us to Socrates and repel us.) His
resourcefulness has, I think, at least two attributes. First, there is his
basic, motivating question, usually cast in the form, "What is (the nature
or definition of) X?" He wants to know what virtue is, or what piety is,
or what knowledge is, or what rhetoric is, and the clever thing is that he
wants to learn these things by asking others - apparent or self-professed
experts in these matters - what they can tell or teach him about these
topics of their expertise. His cleverness or resourcefulness here amounts
to his insight that we ourselves have the answers to such questions - or
else no one has them.
Socrates begins and ends his investigations of the nature of these
matters by asking, fruitfully and courageously, what we, members of this
community, know about these things. In exploring our claims to know
X,Socrates takes upon himself the burden of the truth that, if we have
no answer to these motivating questions, then we are left drily, sadly
ignorant of major portions of our lives and experience, of our world.
(See text at note 23.) Any such failure indicts us, betraying the fact that
we are withholding our knowledge of these matters, out of some fear or
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deadness or lack of awareness - call it a failure or fear of "acknowledgment," one form of knowledge especially called for in philosophy. Long
before Emerson,33 Socrates had the courage and vision to throw us back
on ourselves, back on our own language and our own practices, in asking
and trying to answer the age-old questions of humankind.
The second attribute of his resourcefulness has to do not so much
with where or of whom he asks questions and looks for answers as it
does with his sheer fortitude in pushing ahead with the analysis, his
perseverance in brooking no interference with the question under study,
his incessant wanting to know, his constant search for clarity and
definition. Socrates won't take for an answer, "I don't know," if the
person uttering that phrase is merely pretending to be ignorant, perhaps
for convenience or as a way of refusing to cooperate with Socrates'
search. Refusing to participate in the process of dialectic is not seen by
Socrates as being a legitimate alternative for one who has earlier signalled
his willingness to submit to the rigors of that process. (This must be
contrasted to a participant's uttering the same phrase honestly recognizing his own ignorance, as though it had suddenly dawned on him, which
it sometimes does in the Platonic dialogues, as in life.) At the end of the
Euthyphro, for example, Socrates prods Euthyphro to try again:
Then we must begin again and inquire what piety is. I do
not mean to give in until 1 have found out. Do not regard me as
unworthy; give your whole mind to the question, and this time
tell me the truth .... [new'l What are you doing, my friend!
Will you go away and destroy all my hopes of learning from you
what is pious and what is not, and so of escaping Meletus?34
But Socrates' cleverness sometimes seems to be mere trickery,
even bad faith. Here I am thinking about the fact that some of his
arguments are clearly fallacious, and that Socrates must be aware of this
fact,35 There are., for examole.
two clearlv fallacious arguments which
....
Socrates uses in the Apology in an attempt to sway his auditors.
He says that an old ("common") complaint against him is that he
inquires into forbidden matters. To refute this, he urges those of his
auditors who know his teaching to speak to their friends about his
practices. He says: "1 beg all of you who have ever heard me discussing,
and they are many, to inform your neighbors and tell them if any of
you have ever heard me discussing such matters at all. That will show
'

~
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you that the other common statements about me are as false as this
one. "36 But the mere falsity of one charge against him has absolutely no
probative bearing on the truth or falsity of the other charges against him,
common or not. And later, he says that the charges against him are due
to the indignation he has aroused by puncturing the false pride of his
interlocutors. "Yet I know that it is just this outspokenness which
rouses indignation. But that is only a proof that my words are true, and
that the prejudice against me, and the causes of it, are what I have said. "37
But indignation can be aroused by false allegations against people (made
by Socrates) as well as true allegations. So the reaction of people to
Socrates' goading does not afford a litmus test; it does not prove the
truth of his remarks.
But the best example of Socrates' trickery may be his seemingly
modest claim, "For as soon as I open my mouth they will be refuted,
and I shall prove that I am not a clever speaker in any way at all ... ."
(See text at note 5.) This claim contains a disguised but utterly false
premise, namely, that he has not yet spoken, that he has not yet opened
his mouth. But this claim is entered half-way through his opening
statement! What could be more obvious than the fact that Socrates
already has opened his mouth? And his unspoken premise is dangerous
because it implies that what Socrates has said up to this point in his
opening statement is somehow not his, as though it were not truly
himself speaking, but instead, perhaps, simply a fact of nature, obvious
in itself.
This suggests that in this forum on this occasion Socrates does not
take responsibility for his words. There are two ways in which Socrates
is being irresponsible in his speech here. First, to suggest that he himself
has not yet spoken, denies that he is making controversial, disparaging
claims about his accusers, claims that must be explained and justified.
And it denies that he is elaborating on his own conduct, excusing or
defending it from the characterizations it has received at the hands of his
accusers, and that such explanations of himself again must be tested and
accepted (or rejected) by the jury. So Socrates' seemingly modest claim
implicitly denies the fact that he must substantiate his words, must
ground them in evidence, if his defense of his own conduct and his
counter-claims against his accusers are to stand up in this court of law.
It is irresponsible of him to suggest that we, without more, ought to
accept his words as gospel.
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There is a second, even more fundamental denial being made here.
To suggest that he has not spoken yet, and thus in effect to suggest that
what has gone before in his opening statement is akin to a fact of nature,
denies the fact that Socrates needs to utter his words, to make them
public - in other words, he needs to express himself - if he is to defend
himself against the charges made. In order to speak the truth, we must
not only recognize it, know what it is, but also be prepared and be able
to make it public, to project it into the public realm, into the community we share with others. This is why speaking the truth requires moral
attributes - such as courage - equally as much as intellectual qualities such as the ability to recognize the truth. And this is why "prior
restraint" is normally so insidious a violation of our freedom of thought
and expression, because it preempts public utterance. If we are to defend
ourselves with words, as we do in the law, then first we must find the
right words with which to defend ourselves; subsequently, we must
produce them, utter them; and finally we must prove them, prove what
they say or mean, by carrying our burden of proof to the point where
we convince the jury. 38
In this day and age, these are responsibilities of the professional
representative, the lawyer (which I suppose is one reason why we
sometimes, crudely, think of lawyers as being nothing more than hired
mouthpieces). Socrates, rather than acknowledging the responsibility he
bears as his own attorney, seems to treat his opening statement as though
its production were a natural even~ in the world, and as though what it
stated were so plainly and obviously true that it were engraved in natural
images upon the hearts and minds of his judges and jurors. This is his
appeal to the truth, as though it revealed and expressed itself, without
human help or assistance through any human medium; as though the
truth transmitted itself wordlessly to our souls, which absorb it instantly.
But this is an impossible picture of the truth (as it is of communication,
as it is of language).
Socrates also is irresponsible, I believe, in his denial of his
influence over his students. Rather than take responsibility for setting
these people loose on Athens, he argues that, because he has not taken
money from them in payment for his activities and because he does not
claim to teach anyone anything, he is not responsible for whatever they
may make out his example. "And whether any of them becomes an
upright man or not, I would not justly be held responsible, since I have

HeinOnline -- 14 Legal Stud. F. 278 1990

Socrates' Defense in the A p%r:Y

279

never promised or taught any instruction to any of them. "39 He is
saying that as a gadfly he has no responsibility to the city or his fellowcitizens for his influence on the young who follow and watch him. Yet
Socrates earlier admits that these same youngsters who follow him
around, witnessing his deflation of those who claim to know, "take
pleasure in hearing men cross-examined. They often imitate me among
themselves; then they try their hands at cross-examining other people. "40
His instruction need ~ot be didactic in order for him to be responsible
for its results; as I have argued elsewhere, modelling is a powerful form
of Socratic teaching. 41

§6. Does Socrates Speak the Truth? How?
Socrates emphasizes throughout the Apology that he will speak the
truth, while his accusers do not and cannot. No other concept receives
such emphasis from Socrates as does the "truth" (even though he gives
it very little direct scrutiny). [See 17ab, 18a, 1ge, 20d, 22ab, 23d, 24a,
28a, 28d, 31c, 31e, 32b, 33bc, 34b, 34e, 36d, 41a-c.] He makes it sound
as though the truth is something readily or easily available to us, as
though it were no challenge to tell the truth, as though there were no
difficulty in speaking the truth. And Socrates portrays the jury's search
for truth as an easy, almost effortless one: if they simply focus on his
words versus the words of his accusers, comparing what he says versus
what they say, the jurors will discover the truth. This sketch of an easy
search for truth is sophistic; it promises a route to truth, through
"direct" perception and "plain" speaking, that does not exist.
I count among the fundamental revolutions in human thinking
the discovery - whenever and wherever made, and however many times
made - that truth is something to which we humans (unlike deities) do
not have direct or immediate access, but rather for which we need means
or media of access. We have invented many such means or media
through the centuries, including Socrates' invention of dialectic and
society'S invention of the trial process. Yet at his trial- but only there - Socrates seems to me to deny this fact, instead claiming his words to
have whatever persuasive power they may have over his audience exactly
because these words are said to be unmediated or unpremeditated, simply
occurring to him as he voices them. "I shall use the first words which
come to mind, for I believe that what I have to say is just; .... " (See text
at note 5.) But this very fact - that he takes the truth of what he says,
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its veracity or force, to be a function of how he says it, without
forethought or calculation - shows the importance we place not only on
the words one uses, but haw and why one uses them. Truth in one's
speech - the truth of one's words, what one says - always relates both
to what one has to say, and to haw and why one says it. And where one
says It.
Socrates is saying his words at his trial, in a court of law, and the
two means of finding and expressing the truth that seem most readily
available to him are dialectic and the trial process. I should have thought
that his defense would make use of either or both of these devices, and
yet his self-characterization suggests that he adopts neither. This is the
dilemma I have been trying to elicit in this essay: How are we to
understand him, his words and claims? Is he speaking plainly? Dialectically? Legalistically? Rhetorically? Or yet some other way? And it is
my belief that only to the extent to which we come to some kind of
understanding of Socrates' mode of speech here, thus coming to an
understanding of what he means to be saying and how he makes his
meaning known to us, can we come to judge him, his words and his
claims.
The power of dialectic as a means of revealing the truth seems to
me to be bound up with one's willingness or ability to submit oneself to
its terrors, especially the frightening fact that one never knows a priori
how it is going to turn out. (See text at note 1.) The same might be
said for the trial process, and in closing I want to make a brief comparison of the two processes, for both (I think) are processes designed to
allow the truth to appear, to allow it to be expressed.
For Socrates, truth is discovered dialectically by means of selfexamination and self-reckoning; we discover it for ourselves, or recognize
it through our own efforts. And his dialectical method proceeds on the
understanding that a truth force-fed us is as good as no truth at all,
because we choke on it, or fight it. (As I said above, the compulsion of
argument or logic is not what we look for when using the Socratic
method; self-refutation is our goal.) If we choke on the truth or fight it,
we fail to make it a part of ourselves, which is the only way in which
truth does us any good.
Dialectic is a process that does not trick us into telling the truth
(as cross-examination may), and it is not a process that forces us to tell
the truth (as torture may). Rather, dialectic is a process that allaws us to
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tell the truth, both by enabling us and by affording us the occasion and
opportunity for telling the truth. Dialectic helps us to tell the truth by
helping us feel comfortable about the truth, becoming familiar with it
and getting used to the idea of telling the truth. Sometimes we have to
be coaxed into doing what is right. Dialectic induces us to discover the
truth by recognizing it, recognizing that we already know what it is, but
that now is the time to say it, to utter it out in public. Thus, dialectic
prepares us to admit the truth to ourselves and to confess it to others.
Dialectic allows us to get past ourselves, so that the self is not always
getting in its own way.42
A truth made available to us by dialectic, then, is truly made
available to us by way of this process of argumentation and analysis and
synthesis; it is not a truth pre-existing or already glimpsed or articulated
beforehand, simply withheld until the appropriate moment in order for
it to be sprung on an unsuspecting interlocutor by a manipulative
dialectician. Rather, an answer or insight worked out by the dialectical
process and formulated from within it is something the truth of which
may not be recognized, the force of which may not be felt, until we
have brought it before ourselves - or brought ourselves before it. This
occurs when a truth appears as a natural development in the conversation or debate composing the dialectical process, which means that it is
allowed or assisted to appear by the dialectical process of conversation
and questioning. And then its force is apt to strike us as both inevitable
and revelatory (even if also paradoxical).
A trial is a search for truth, in part, and this aspect of trials is
evidenced by the oaths witnesses take and the general fact-finding
processes through which any trial proceeds. But a trial does not seek the
truth just by any method or means. Only certain routes to the truth are
followed or pursued (as suggested by the rules of evidence, and the
privilege against self-incrimination, and other matters as well). While
gaining the truth is an important value in the trial process, truth is not
its sole value. Other values - of justice, fairness, due process, efficiency,
reliability, timeliness, and the like - also come into play. Hence,
whatever truth results from a trial is very much a product of its process,
including its multiplicity of values. What the trial process makes
available to us, then, is purchased at the cost of its weaknesses as well as
its strengths, its gaps as well as its guarantees.
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It occurs to me in this regard that the multiple protections and
guarantees afforded witnesses and defendants in trials serv~ a function
similar to that which I ascribed above to Socrates' dialectical method:
these values and restraints enable us to expound the truth by creating a
context in which we feel comfortable admitting it to ourselves, to our
consciousness. Trials seen in this way proceed on the faith that we
already know the truth - we being the community at large, or some
member of it - only we must be eased into allowing it to surface,
allowing it to find its voice, to speak or to be spoken. Once spoken, it
then only needs to be recognized for what it is, acknowledged. (This is
not always so simple a task as it may sound, but I take it that our
description of the trial process as a "sifting and winnowing" of the facts
is meant to capture the kind of intellectual effort at work here.)
But Socrates seems uncomfortable with this fact about trials, and
instead wants to engage in special pleading, as though he should be
permitted to reap the benefits of a trial without also incurring its
particular costs. For whatever reason, he does not find the trial process
accommodating as a means of expounding the truth about his life and
teaching. When late in his opening statement, he describes himself as
literally a "stranger" to the law, a stranger to the Athenian law-court,and
thus a stranger to the forms of expression and argument common to the
law, he is announcing his estrangement from the law. He asks forgiveness for this fact, and exemption from any legal custom he may infringe
unintentionally in his effort to tell his story to the jury. (See text at
note 5.) He claims only to speak truthfully to the jury in a direct and
commonplace manner. But to speak directly to others, unrehearsed or
unpremeditated, or to tell them that that is what one is doing - as
Socrates tells his jurors - is to claim a certain specific- form for one's
words. He is claiming that they come straight from the heart, unvarnished; and further, that because of this fact about their condition, his
jurors should take his words as true. Their truth is vouched for by the
process or form of their production, how they are uttered, and how they
came to be uttered.
Socrates' wish for his words to appear unbidden as it were, or
unmotivated by him, is too proud a wish, almost amounting to a boast.
And it contravenes perhaps the single most central theme of his dialectical method, namely, that we take responsibility for our words. (By his
lights - and not just his alone - this becomes a way of taking respon-
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sibility for one's actions, and for one's self.) He wants his words to
speak directly to his audience, as though they did not have to be produced within a specific medium (or forum) in order to get from him to
the auditors. And he wants his auditors to accept his words on their
face, as though the jury should look right through Socrates' obvious
desire, his overriding motive, to be acquitted of the charges against him.
But what one says in a court of law is inevitably colored by the
context in which it is said and by the intentions and motives and
purposes of the speaker. And this is not a truth special or peculiar to
the courtroom or the law; it is true in all of the contexts that constitute
our lives and language. Whatever we say is always, inevitably, necessarily, said from a certain position within a certain context subject to certain
conditions and limitations. To wish for exemption from such conditions
is to desire to be freed from the very conditions that help to make us
intelligible - and that help to make the truth or falsity of our utterances
testable.
And is this what Socrates wishes, or expresses, at his trial? How
are we to take him here, his words and his claims?

NOTES

..

This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American
Culture Association, in a panel discussion entitled "Socrates and American Culture
Today," held in Toronto in March, 1990. My thanks go to Wythe Holt, David Papke,
and Paul Hayden for organizing the panel and inviting me to participate. This revision
incompletely incorporates various cautions voiced by Professors Holt, L.H. LaRue, and
Kathleen Haney at the Toronto meeting, some of which were subsequently reiterated
or elaborated in letters from Holt, Haney, and another auditor at the meeting,
Professor Sheri Crawford. Since none of them thinks that I am correct in my reading
of the Apology, I appreciate their willingness to try to get me to see the errors of my
way. But for the most important criticisms of my work, as usual, I owe a deep debt
of gratitude to James Boyd White. His work remains for me both indispensable and
a living inheritance of the best in Socrates' teaching.
Spencer, my son, this one's for you. Your addition has been a trial, but your truth
keeps shining through.
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